Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.


17 B. Jowett and Martin more naturally construe οἷς ἢν πρέπον ξενίοις with what goes before.

17 περὶ πολιτείας. Wecannot infer from this, as Mr. A.-H. does, that Plato intends to set the seal of his matured approval on the political theories of the Republic, while indicating that its ontology is superseded. The Republic itself explicitly states that its κεφά- Aatoy is ethical and social (cf. 367, 369 sqq., 484 AB). Ontology is introduced only in aid of the discussion of the philosopher king, the higher education and similar themes, and there is frequent ex- plicit recognition of the limitations that this method involves. Cf. 435 CD, 484 A, 506 DE with 506 A, where the practical object is emphasized. The ontology of 596-7, whatever interpretation we put upon it, is obviously mainly method (596 A) and cannot be pressed. The ‘more advanced ontology of the Timaeus” has to be inferred from the Philebus, Sophist, and Theaetetus. Our editor himself notes the agreement of Republic and Timaeus at 27 C, 29 C, 31 A, 42 Ὁ, 47 B, 64 C, etc. The differences he notes at 51 C, 51 E, 52 A are matters of inference. Lastly, that the

1The following notes are intended to be used with Mr. Archer-Hind’s edition of the Timaeus or with Hermann’s text. They are partly critical of Mr. Archer-Hind, partly supplementary. The matter I have added is, I think, not to be found in Stallbaum or Martin. It consists mainly of Platonic and Aristotelian parallels and observations on Platonic usage. As I shall be obliged to emphasize the points of difference between myself and Mr, Archer- Hind, I will add that he seems to me not only to have surpassed his prede- cessors in accuracy, but to have succeeded in what they did not even attempt— the rendering of the tone and movement of the original. Since these notes were put in type, Mr. J. Cook Wilson has published a review of Archer-Hind’s work. Mr. Wilson partly anticipates me on some points—especially at 37 ABC and 53 B. His captious, but vague criticism will not aid the student much. Mr. Archer-Hind has undoubtedly read Stallbaum’s notes carelessly and done him injustice, but all serious students are aware of Stallbaum’s in- competency in all higher questions of Platonic exegesis. Of Mr. Archer-Hind’s indebtedness to the Engelmann translator” I am unable to speak. One seems to detect the flavor of an undigested German original in the unlucky “also” (p. 84), for which Nettleship (Mind, LIII, p. 130) proposes to read therefore.”


Laws are not “an abandonment by Plato of his political ideal” we learn not from the Timaeus, but from the explicit statement of the Laws themselves, 739 CD, 807 B.

18 A ὅσα προσήκει τούτοις : not “all studies which are connected with these,” but ‘all studies befitting these” (men); cf. Rep. 526 C, 530 C, Leges 822 A.

18 D ταῦτα εὐμνημόνευτα λέγεις: NOt easy to remember this too as you describe it,” but this too is easy to remember for the reason you assign.” Ibid. εὐθὺς γίγνοιντο, not “securing immediately,” but technically “from birth,” “by birth.” Cf. Leges 782 E, Tim. 76 E, Menex. 237 A, Theaetet. 186 C.

19 B. Stallbaum’s ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὰ ταῦτ᾽ should be accepted. ταὐτὰ ταῦτα Should not be used, I think, except when there is a sugges- tion of applying the facts recalled to a new purpose; as in Gorg. 518 A, Repub. 329 B, Tim. 60 D, 88 C.

19 E ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον λόγοις. Cf. Rep. 473 A φύσιν ἔχει πρᾶξιν λέξεως ἧττον ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι, κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ; instead of the erroneous “well furnished with many fine discourses on other subjects,” read “have had experience of many discourses and other fine things.” For the experience in discourses cf. Gorgias 457 C; for the καλὰ ἄλλα of Plato’s sophists cf. Protag. 341 A and Hipp. Maj. 282 D. For πλανητὸν----κατὰ πόλεις cf. Rep. 371 D with Sophist 223 E and Protag. 314 AB. Below, instead of fall short in their conception of philosophers and statesmen,” render “fail to hit the mind of men at once both philosophers and statesmen.”

20 B εἰς---πόλεμον. For prominence of war cf. Leges 626 A τῷ δ᾽ ἔργῳ πάσαις πρὸς πάσας ras πόλεις ἀεὶ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι.

20 D λόγον---εἰσηγήσατο, “told us a story.” Rather, “introduced a topic,” “suggesteda theme.” The Lexicon unnecessarily assigns to εἰσηγέομαι a special meaning ‘narro’ here and in Symp. 189 Ὁ.

21 A οὐ λεγόμενον μὲν. The translation “though unrecorded in history” is right, cf. 21 and 22C. Ina note the editor strangely enough attacks his own translation, and will have it that οὐ λεγόμενον means not a fiction, πλασθέντα μῦθον, but a fact.

21 D ὡς ἀληθῆ διακηκοὼς, “heard it as true.” It is perhaps not over-subtle to note that the emphasis is not on the priest’s his- toric credibility, but on Solon’s willingness and the present company’s desire to accept the tale; cf. 26 D and Gorgias 523 A with Leges 684 A.

22 A ὡς διεγένοντο, how they survived.” For this “rare use”


cf. Isoc. Archidamus 91 εἰ μηδενὸς ἄλλου φροντίζοιεν τοῦ διαγενέσθαι καὶ περιποιῆσαι σφᾶς αὐτούς. The translation here misses the effect of the position of μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν ad in contrast with the ante- diluvian Phoroneus. This perhaps favors taking διαγίγνεσθαι as a synonym of didyew, how they fared.”

22 Ἐ; σωζόμενα λέγεται madatdrara. ‘Note the order. Render: Because they escape destruction are the most ancient that are told”; cf. Critias 107 εἰκότα λεγόμενα. Jowett’s “are said to be the oldest” is perhaps possible, but I think wrong. τὸ δὲ ἀληθές is equivalent to a τῷ δ᾽ ἔργῳ opposed to the λόγῳ implicit in λέγεται.

23 A τινα διαφορὰν ἄλλην ἔχον. The scholiast paraphrases by παραδόξως ἐκβεβηκός. Compare Polit. 272 C καὶ πυνθανόμενοι παρὰ πάσης φύσεως εἴ τινά τις ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἔχουσα ἤσθετό τι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων εἰς συναγυρμὸν φρονήσεως, with Ar. Met. 980a, 26 ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν ἡμᾶς αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς. This use of the word is connected with the conception of knowledge in Theaetet. 208 sqq.

23 C γράμμασι---ἀφώνους ; cf. 27 B and Aeschylus Septem 463 Bod δὲ χοὖτος γραμμάτων ἐν συλλαβαῖς.

24 Β ἔτι δὲ τῆς ὁπλίσεως σχέσις κι τ λ. This is, I think, best con- strued by making a parenthesis of the words καθάπερ... παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, placing a comma after ὑμῖν, and taking πρώτοις as a rhetorical repeti- tion of πρῶτοι, thus: ‘‘ Wherewith we first of the men of Asia were armed, the goddess having taught us first as she did you in your region.” The point emphasized here is not the priority of the Athenians to the Egyptians, which is better expressed by προτέρους below, but that each people was first in its own continent.

26 C iva εὐποροῖεν λόγων, NOt so much “share my affluence of words,” as “be provided with a theme.”

27 C πάντα κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις μὲν μάλιστα, ἑπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν. The balance of the sentence and the thought make it better to take ἑπομένως = ‘secondly,’ rather than ‘consistently.’ The word is used by Aristotle in that sense Met. 1030a, 22 τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δ᾽ ἑπομένως, and may well be so used by Plato. Alcinous employs it in both meanings. We learn from Phaedrus 273 E that the true object of speech is to please the gods rather than men. In Republic 528 A Socrates recommends pleasing oneself rather than others. Timaeus combines the two principles here; cf. also Sophist 264 E.

27 C γέγονεν, not “how far it is created,” but “whether it is created ἢ; literally, “how it is a created thing.” γέγονεν is used


pregnantly for γεγονός ἐστι opposed to ἀγενές ἐστι. has no quanti- tative force; cf. 48 A.

27 D διανοοῦμαι. Stallbaum’s is not necessary; but the meaning is not “carry out my intentions,” but “expound my views,” cf. 48 C δηλῶσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα, and Leges 966 A-B, where διανοεῖσθαι is made==»oeiv, and as here is placed in antithesis to ἐνδείκνυσθαι.

28 A τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ : cf. Polit. 308 C μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἰδέαν δημιουργεῖ.

28 ( τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα. Our editor construes this natural language of religious awe as an indication that Plato must have had some metaphysical ἀρχή in mind, and not the simple concep- tion of a personal creator of the universe. But Plato’s language here has been repeatedly adopted by the most devout Christian writers. The passage is quoted by nearly all the Greek fathers, and generally with qualified approval.

29 A μηδ᾽ εἰπεῖν τινὶ θέμις ; cf. Epinomis 986 Β οἵους οὐδὲ θέμις εἰπεῖν.

29 Β μέγιστον δὴ παντὸς ἄρξασθαι. Not it is all-important,” but “it is important to begin everything”; cf. Leges 753 E. We have as often, a general proposition followed by its specific application.

πάντων μάλιστα and παντὸς μᾶλλον have no analogue in μέγιστον παντός.

Below cf. Meno. 80 ( καλαὶ γὰρ οἶμαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, and Polit. 278 sqq. for παράδειγμα.

30 A. “Who are the φρόνιμοι dvdpes? Probably some Pytha- goreans.” Rather, I think, the blessed ancients generally whom Plato and Aristotle love to cite against the materialists; cf. Phileb. 28 D, 30 D, and Ar. Met. 1074b, and Leges passim. We need not press the exact statement of the principle here given. But Metaphys. rogrb, 9 comes very near it: οἷον Φερεκύδης καὶ ἕτεροί τινες τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον τιθέασι. The τέλος ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ cited by our editor from Stobaeus Ecl. II 64 is purely ethical and refers to Theaetet. 176 B.

30 A πᾶν ὅσον ἢν ὁρατὸν παραλαβών. Our editor assumes here, as elsewhere (cf. infra on 48 A), that the pre-existence of chaos and the creation in time are to be understood κατ᾽ ἐπίνοιαν only. In support of this view he quotes Proclus and Apuleius, who, like the majority of post-Aristotelian thinkers, were dominated by the conception of the unchanging Aristotelian heaven. The sole argu- ment by which he justifies his rejection of the numerous specific


declarations of Plato cited in Martin’s luminous dissertation is that “it is impossible that Plato could have imagined that this disorderly motion ever actually existed ; since all motion is of ψυχή, and ψυχή is intelligent.” But this is begging the question. The necessary intelligence of ψυχή is implied only where, as in the Laws, Plato, determined to find some little plausibility for his ethical argument, smuggles in τὰ ψυχῆς along with the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, which is all he has proved. But our editor cannot rely on this passage because τὰ ψυχῆς include ἤθη καὶ τρόποι, which he does not want. The Phaedrus tells us (246 B and 249 B) that soul appears in various forms, that every human soul has had a glimpse of the realities, and that soul made perfect governs the κόσμος. But it does not state that all soul is inherently informed by νοῦς working towards the good. The Politicus tells us of alternate cycles of government by the mind of God and by a σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία, a kind of soul evidently analogous to the blind Will of Schopenhauer or the Unconscious of Hartmann. The Laws explicitly declare that there are two kinds of soul, and that the universe ci—pantxds re καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔρχεται must be supposed to be ruled by the evil soul. Plato does not aim at consistency in so doubtful a matter (cf. Phaedrus 265 CD), but the κακὴ ψυχή, the σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία, and the πλανωμένη αἰτία all fulfil practically the same function—they account for action which is not a development of νοῦς, and it is the modern imagination governed by the Théodicée of Malebranche, not the Platonic imagination inspired by Hesiod and the pre-Socratics, that refuses to admit such action.

31 A. Our editor compares Republic 597 C and Ar. Met. 1074a, 31, the bearing of which on this passage was brought out in my dissertation De Platonis Ideis, p. 30. It should also be observed that here, as well as in Republic 597 C, Plato is endeav- oring to evade the τρίτος ἄνθρωπος, and that the terminology of this passage is unfavorable to the inference drawn in behalf of Plato’s “later doctrine of ideas by Mr. Jackson (J. of Phil. 22, pp. 292-3) from Parmenides 132 DE-133 A. Mr. Jackson there argues, laying undue stress on 133 A, that Parmenides accepts the idea as παράδειγμα, and merely objects to ὁμοιότης as the basis of its relation to particulars. In the “later” theory, then, we expect ὁμοιότης to be abandoned; and yet while in Parmen. 132 E it is stated explicitly : οὐκ dpa οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἴδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, we find here the terms ὁμοιῶσαι, ὅμοιον ἀφωμοιωμένον, cis ὁμοιότητα, etc. (cf. 52 A, 50 D, 51 A), used to characterize the relation of the particular to the


idea (cf. Polit. 278 A). The fact is, Plato was well aware that the objections of the Parmenides could not be answered by any reconstitution of his theory, but only by the transcendentalist’s familiar device of affirming in one breath what is denied in another. The particular is only a likeness of the idea, but it never can be really like its exemplar. It is a pity that Mr. Archer-Hind should allow himself to employ the un-Platonic expression νοητός κόσμος in this connection. Philebus 64 B and Republic 517 B do not justify an expression which is introduced into the criticism of the Timaeus only in order to prepare the way for Philo Judaeus and Plotinus. Plato’s αὐτὸ ζῷον is not Philo Judaeus’ idea of a city in the mind of the architect. It is the general idea of living thing and nothing more. Plato is proceeding as naively as in Republic 596 AB. A living thing by the Platonic method must be patterned by its maker on the general idea of living thing. The universe comes nearer its model than other living things because it contains the same generic subdivision, and also because, like the idea, it is one. This, of course, does not, as our editor thinks, indicate an advance from the doctrine of Republic 596 A. Plato says there, not that the idea must have many particulars, but only that where we see a number of similar particulars with a common name we assume anidea. The two propositions are not convertible (cf. Ar. Met. 1040a, 26, who adopts the same rigid view).

32 AB. The mathematical propositions Plato may or must have had in mind here are explained by our editor after Bockh and Martin. His treatment of the subject would have profited by Zeller’s elaborate note (op. cit. pp. 671-73). For the rest, so far as the application to the elements is concerned, the simpler explanations of Cousin and Grote are really quite sufficient. For the words καθ᾽ ὅσον ἦν δυνατόν make it probable that the pro- portion between the elements is nothing more nor less than that of 56 Ὁ, 4:8=8:20!

32 D τοῦ κόσμου ξύστασις ; Cf. δὲ τοῦ ὅλου ξύστασίς ἐστι κόσμος καὶ οὐρανός. Ar. de Cael. I το.

32 D οὐδὲ δύναμιν. “δύναμιν is not to be understood as poten- tiality,’ but as ‘power’ or ‘faculty.’” Plato’s inner affinity with the modern associationist school is by nothing more strongly marked than by this, that he is not careful to maintain this distinction. Both power and existence in the phenomenal world are for him potentialities ; cf Sophist 247 E with Locke on Power (Bohn, Vol. I, p. 360): Power, thus considered, is two-fold, viz. as able to


make, or able to receive any change”; cf. also A. J. P., IX 417, and Phileb. 29 C πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὔσῃ.

33 D ἐκ τέχνης ; cf. Sophist 265 E θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θεία τέχνῃ. With μάτην cf. δὲ θεὸς καὶ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν. Ar. de Caelo I 4.

34 A κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι στρεφόμενον. In his desire to “eliminate the distinction between spirit and matter” and the notion of a pre- cosmic chaos, our editor slightly misrepresents the familiar myth of the Politicus. He says that the reversed motion of the universe in Polit. 269 A sqq. is “the recoil from that which had been imparted by God.” The only words that even seem to justify this are 270 A κατὰ καιρὸν ἀφεθέντα τοιοῦτον ὥστε ἀνάπαλιν στρέφεσθαι, etc. But the phraseology throughout (cf. 269 C αὐτόματον) implies an inherent principle of motion; sometimes the world is guided by God, sometimes left to the subordinate intelligence that God imparted to the original disorder of which the universe was full, πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικέσθαι (273 C); cf. especially 272 Ε τὸν δὲ δὴ κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν εἱμαρμένη τε καὶ ξύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία; cf. 272 A with Tim. 52 D and infra on 48 A.

34 A λογισμὸς θεοῦ x. τι X. Jowett’s paraphrase (Vol. II, p. 493), “the thought of God made God,” is a striking illustration of the rhetorical temptations that seem to make it impossible fora modern commentator to represent the Timaeus correctly. We profess to have abjured Plotinus, but still read the later books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics into everything.

34 C. Mr. Archer-Hind is wrong in objecting to Stallbaum’s citation of Laws 904 A on the ground that οὐκ αἰώνιον there applies to the ξύστασις of soul and body, but not to ψυχή and σῶμα severally. This reading is undoubtedly supported by Phaedrus 245 C and 246 CD, but the words γένεσις yap οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἦν ζῴων ἀπολομένου τούτοιν θατέρου make it simply impossible (cf. Phaedo 70 CD). For the rest it is idle to deny that the Laws assign ψυχή to γένεσις ; cf. 966 E and 967 D ψυχή τε ὡς ἔστι πρεσβύτατον ἁπάντων ὅσα γονῆς μετείληφεν. We must admit zxzconstantia Platonis to this extent.

35 A. Our editor’s treatment of the ψυχογονία is unsatisfactory even if we allow it to be correct. Ignoring the differing readings of scholars like Zeller, and citing no Platonic parallels, he gives dogmatically an interpretation of his own; and this interpretation he states not in proximate terms, but in the language of his own metaphysical theory of the true Platonism.

I doubt if any absolutely certain and satisfactory construction


of the Greek is attainable. But I will endeavor to state clearly the difficulties, the alternative solutions, and the general signifi- cance of the passage, with regard to which I think certainty can be attained, And first we must be careful not to reduce the num- ber of the elements of the problem by rashly identifying apparent synonyms. The imaginative method of the Timaeus treats different words as different entities, and if we identify approximate synonyms, in the interests of a preconceived system, some of the meaning escapes.

The ἀμέριστος οὐσία, for example, is not identical with ταὐτόν (I cannot guess what Mr. Archer-Hind means by saying it is “‘iden- tical but not co-extensive”’), nor is it “‘ pure mind”’ as yet undiffer- entiated. It is plainly the “Idee,” the ideas, the ideal reality and unity as distinguished from the reality we apprehend only as divided and dissipated ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις (Phileb. 15 B; cf. Theaetet. 205 C pia τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος, Repub. 525 E εὐλαβούμενοι μή ποτε φανῇ τὸ ἕν μὴ ἕν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια, Repub. 476 A).

The περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη μεριστὴ οὐσία is not primarily the θάτερον, still less is it “differentiated intelligence”; it is the unity of the idea as we apprehend it divided among concrete things (cf. the passages cited above and Symp. 210 C where τὸ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὸν is contrasted with τὸ én’ εἴδει καλόν, which we are told is povoedés, etc.) ταὐτόν and θάτερον are primarily the logical catego- ries of sameness and difference discussed in the Sophist. It is not necessary to answer Jowett’s amazing assertion (Plato II 494) that “the other of the Timaeus...has nothing to do with the other of the Sophist.”” When Plato descends from the transcen- dental world of Symposium 211, both of these categories, since they are necessary conditions of intelligible speech, present them- selves as well among the ideas as in concrete things, and the θάτερον is then as truly an οὐσία or φύσις (Sophist 258 B) as the ταὐτόν.

When we turn to οὐσία or φύσις in the transcendental sense of Timaeus 38 AB, 52 B, which Plato does whenever he can escape the trammels of logic, ταὐτόν, of course, approaches the idea or absolute povds—del κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, while θάτερον tends to become identified with the multiplicity of changing particulars that are now one thing and nowanother. Pressing this analogy we might come to identify ταὐτόν with the ἀμέριστος οὐσία, and θάτερον with the μεριστή. And this identification would be helped by the logical terminology of the Sophist (cf. 257 C θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκ ερ- ματίσθαι; cf. 258 D).


οὐσία iS a πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον. Sometimes it means a particular substance or φύσις, the Aristotelian οὐσία, sometimes transcendental being, and sometimes the mixed logical relative being (cf Sophist 254 D τὸ δέγε ὃν μικτὸν ἀμφοῖν, whereas the ideas are transcendentally ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα, Phileb. 59 C). The three οὐσίαι of our passage, the ἀμέριστος, the μεριστή, and the τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, are equivocally denoted by the common term οὐσία, much as the three kinds of φιλία in Leges 837 A: δύο yap ὄντα αὐτὰ καὶ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τρίτον ἄλλο εἶδος ἐν ὄνομα περιλαβὸν πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν καὶ σκότον ἀπεργάζετα. Mr. Archer-Hind, ignoring all this, says that οὐσία is the unity of consciousness, that is to say, that ὑποκείμενον of psychic processes which Mill was unable to discern, which Kant aimed at by his synthetic unity of apper- ception, and which most thinkers postulate in some form or other. But this thought, so far as it is in Plato, is expressed not by the τρίτον οὐσίας εἶδος, but by the subsequent words καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέα. As Zeller, ed. 1875, II 1, 647, rightly says: Nur diese beiden [sc. ταὐτόν and θάτερον] werden neben der οὐσία als Theile der Weltseele genannt, das Untheilbare und Theilbare sind blos Bestandtheile der οὐσία. The close par- allelism of the expression in Theaetet. 184 D εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε τι δεῖ καλεῖν, Shows for the rest that ἰδέα, and not οὐσία, is the word that expresses the psychic unity demanded by Mr. Archer-Hind. These five categories of the Platonic logic and metaphysic are treated as real substances and commingled to form the soul (cf. Zeller ubi supra, Alcinous εἰσαγωγή 14); to the end, as we learn in 37 BC, that the soul may take cognizance of sameness and diversity in the world of divided as well as undivided οὐσία. So far all is clear, but there are some obscurities in the text. We have seen that there are probably two stages in the ψυχογονία : (1) the “chemical”? combination of the divided and undivided substance in οὐσία, and (2) the union of οὐσία, ταὐτόν and θάτερον to form the soul. But in the Greek, on the words describing the preliminary formation of οὐσία follow close the words τῆς re ταὐτοῦ φύσεως αὖ πέρι καὶ τῆς θατέρου.: This seems to give us the alternative of identifying the ταὐτόν and θάτερον with the ἀμέριστος and μεριστὴ οὐσία, OF of assuming that the mingling of the latter drew with or after it some admixture of the former. Grote adopts the former alternative, Zeller not very clearly the latter. Martin holds that the first mingling of the divided and undivided involved a partial prelimi- nary union of the same and the other, which facilitated the final difficult reunion of these two refractory elements in the soul.


These different interpretations involve different views of the syntax. Mr. Archer-Hind omits αὖ πέρι, construes the genitives τῆς ἀμερίστου, etc., as loose anticipative apposition to ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, and makes the second genitives τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ, etc., dependent on ἐν μέσῳ (though his punctuation is hopelessly irreconcilable with his rendering). Zeller, rejecting πέρι, retains ad in sense of ‘“‘ferner auch,” and, reversing Archer-Hind’s syntax, construes the first genitives with ἐν μέσῳ and the second with ἐξ. I think all the genitives alike are “loose” genitives of origin helped by ἐξ ἀμφοῖν and possibly by ἐν μέσῳ. The first ἐν μέσῳ need not be construed with any genitive ; it is, as it were, epexegetic of τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, fulfilling the function of μέσην in 74 D μίαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν μέσην, Or Of μικτὴν in Phileb. 27 B ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν, etc. If referred to anything, however, it must be to the divided and undivided like the second ἐν μέσῳ (cf. now Nettleship, Mind, LIII, p. 132).

35 B. Our editor’s explanation of the harmonic divisions of the soul is made up from Martin and Westphal. He is quite right, in spite of Béckh and Zeller (op. cit. pp. 653-5), in rejecting the ἀποτομή and the 36 terms of the pseudo-Timaeus Locrus, for the simple reason that they are not in the text. Later theorists would be sure to add them. He should have observed, however, that his modern musical notation can represent Greek scales only on the (I think doubtful) supposition that Plato’s intervals were purely theo- retic, and that in practice the ancients always used our intervals and half-intervals. The text of the Timaeus really gives us nothing but a succession of tetrachords with the intervals 8:9, 8:9, 243: 256. These intervals through two octaves give us the διάτονον διτονιαῖον Of Ptolemy, if Martin’s tables are to be trusted, though Mr. Archer-Hind declares that Plato’s scale “is διάτονον σύντονον Of the strictest sort.” We have no means of deciding how extensive a musical scale Plato contemplated. For the extension of the series to the number 27 may have only an astronomical significance. All that can be certainly assigned to music is the succession of the three intervals in the tetrachord. There is possibly one hitherto unnoticed means of determining the extent of the particular series of numbers Plato had in mind. The words, 36 B, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ μιχθέν ... οὕτως ἤδη πᾶν ἀναλώκει, if they mean anything, must signify that assuming the first portion cut off to be 2 of the whole, and x to be an integer, the sum of the fractional parts = unity. The sum of the fractions in the true series, then, must be an integer.


36 C ἐπὶ δεξιά. The contradiction with the Laws (760 D), where the east is ἐπὶ δεξιά, is sufficiently explained by our editor, after Martin, by the statement that Plato knew right and left to be arbi- trary terms, and employed them to suit his convenience. There is, perhaps, another special reason for making the circle of ταὐτόν proceed ἐπὶ δεξιά. In successive logical dichotomies the unzty or sameness of the idea sought is found by proceeding always to the right ; cf. Sophistes 264 E and Phaedr. 266 A, where right and left are made to convey further connotations of praise and dis- paragement. Or we might reconcile Timaeus and Laws by means of the ἀνακύκλησις of the Politicus.

327Α ψυχή. The “strange” position of ψυχή is intentional and effective. The omission of the article and the isolated αὐτή convey a truly Platonic suggestion, that the real “self” of the heavens is not the visible σῶμα of the firmament, but the soul made to par- take of reason and harmony; cf. 38 A for similar implication concerning the stars, and cf. the language of 40 A and the locus classicus Alc. I 129-30. Below our editor is wrong to press νοητῶν into the service of his modern idealism. The Demiurgus is νοητός, not in any technical sense because thought is to be identified with its object, but simply because he belongs to the γένος---ἀναίσθητον πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι (Laws 898 DE). As for saying that Plato could not have used λογιστικόν for νοητόν in 37 B before he “deliberately affirmed the identity of thought and its object,” he might as well say that the phrase θρέψαντα---ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεεινὸν (Rep. 606 B) could have been penned only after he deliberately affirmed the identity of pity and its object. This confounding of the sub- jective and objective is not infrequent even when the language has developed distinct terms as νοητός and νοητικός. There are many cases where the better reading is still undecided.

Where the Greek language had not made the distinction, the ambiguity was inevitable. Plato likes to use λογισμός and its paronyms for the higher reason which is a kind of calculation. The term λογιστός for the objective correlate of λογισμός does not seem to have been in use, though Stephanus wished to read it here, and the use of λογιστικός was inevitable. In Charmides 174 A τὸ λογιστικόν is used in this objective sense with πεττευτικός and ὑγιεινός, for which likewise the Greek language lacked a distinctly dis- criminated objective term (Ast’s i. 4. τὴν λογιστικήν is sufficiently refuted by the context). Zeller, who pointed out the difficulty (op. cit. p. 662), would read αἰσθητικόν (“das der Wahrnehmung


fahige Subjekt”’), to which he makes αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχήν refer. He thinks it a simpler remedy to read αὐτόν. Our editor reads αὐτά.

37 B κατὰ ταὐτὸν. Should we not read κατὰ ταῦτα" κατὰ ταὐτὸν cannot, of course, be taken, with Martin, to mean “cette parole vraie par son rapport avec le méme,” and I do not think it can mean “pariter,” “equally,” “alike,” in the quantitative sense assigned to it by our editor, Stallbaum, and Jowett (cf Rep. 436 C), nor is the meaning apt if possible. Phrases like κατὰ ταῦτα by way of pleonastic resumption are frequent in the Timaeus (cf. 40 B κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα, and 48 A, in both of which places our editor silently corrects Jowett, 46 E, 76 C, 80 D where some read κατὰ ταὐτὰ. Here the phrase may be simply resumptive of the process described in the preceding sentence, or it may refer specifically to the enume- ration of quasi-Aristotelian categories. At any rate Plato does not tell us that the Adyos is true “alike,” but that it is true in the manner or matters aforesaid. ἐφάπτηται, etc., in 37 A represents the αἴσθησις out of which arise, in the Platonic psychology, δόξα and its accompanying λόγος ; cf. Theaetet. 179 C αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ai κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι, and 194 B δόξα ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς γιγνομένη καταντικρὺ pev... ἀληθής, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδής, a Sentence which illustrates our passage in many ways.’

37 τούτω. Proclus is probably right in referring this to the two pairs δόξαι πίστεις νοῦς ἐπιστήμης In protesting against the mate- rialists Plato confounds the boundaries ; cf. Leges 892 B. Below, τῶν ἀιδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς dyahua. There is nothing to surprise us in this phrase if we remember that Plato uses “divine” as loosely as Cicero. The ideas themselves may well be gods (cf. σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας, Phileb. 62 A, and Polit. 309 C, where true opinion about justice in the soul is θείαν----ἐν δαιμονίῳ γένει), or Plato may have relapsed into the strain of Republic 596 C. The best com- mentary is the alternative offered in Epinomis 983 E-984 A 4 yap θεοὺς αὐτοὺς ταῦτα ὑμνητέον ὀρθότατα θεῶν εἰκόνας ὡς ἀγάλματα ὑπολαβεῖν

γεγονέναι θεῶν αὐτῶν ἐργασαμένων.

Τ1 cannot accept J. Cook Wilson’s defence of Stallbaum against Archer- Hind here. Sameness and difference are among the things told bythe soul ; and the subjunctive is no obstacle to this construction. Mr. Archer-Hind’s exaggeration of ὅπῃ into place” in order to secure another category is of no moment. εἶναι πρὸς ἕκαστον = “to act upon each thing” is of course not a perfect equation, but it represents the meaning, and Mr. Archer-Hind can easily defend himself if he chooses with the aid of Theaetetus 160 ΒΟ--- τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοί ἐστι, Cf. a similar antithesis of γίγνεσθαι and πάσχειν Euthy- phron 10 C,


37 D ἡ---τοῦ ζῴου φύσις. “The nature of the ideal” is one of those rhetorical temptations which the judicious interpreter should resist.

38 Β ὧν οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς λέγομεν. Speak inaccurately rather than “incorrectly.” There is a difference.

38 C αἰῶνα. The word has rhetorical rather than strictly meta- physical force; cf. Ar. de Caelo 1, 9: τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχοντα ζωὴν καὶ τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην διατελεῖ τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τοὔνομα θείως ἔφθεγκται παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων. In the passage before us αἰώνιον may be a mere play on αἰῶνος.

38 τὴν δ᾽ ἐναντίαν εἰληχότας αὐτῷ δύναμιν. May we not escape the difficulty of attributing to Plato an obviously inadequate hypothesis, and account for Cicero’s vim guandam contrariam, by reading m} δ᾽ ἐναντίαν cf. Theaetet. 191 B πῃ δυνατόν, and Polit. 306 Β κατὰ δή τινα τρόπον ... στάσιν ἐναντίαν ἔχοντε.

39 Β. Our editor reads very plausibly καθ᾽ for καὶ τά. The subject of προιέναι above is αὐτά implicit in αὐτῶν.

39 D τὸν τέλεον ἐνιαυτόν. Zeller (op. cit. II 1, p. 684) is probably right in saying that Plato dogmatically fixed the length of the perfect year as 10,000 years.

39 E apés τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως. Not by its assimila- tion to the eternal being,” but rather by imitation of the eternity of its (sc. τοῦ ζῴου) nature.” Our editor, like the Neo-Platonists, wants to escape from the ζῷον to the region of eternal being generally and the νοητὸς κόσμος.

39 E-40 A ἧπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας; cf. Phileb. 16 C-D δεῖν--- ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν---ζητεῖν εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν. Grote strangely errs in making men one of the four classes. From this passage and pp. 30-31 we see that in the Timaeus Plato assumes coexistent ideas of genera, sub-genera, and species. This is the doctrine attributed to him by Aristotle, and if we can only understand that Plato used the ideas seriously only as postulated unities of logical method, and give up trying to construct systems out of his myths, the doctrine presents no difficulties. Accepted literally, however, it is quite irreconcilable with the theory of the limitation of ideas to ὁπόσα φύσει, so far as that limitation is supposed to remove difh- culties. For, as the Aristotelian polemic repeatedly points out, the coexistence of ideas of genera and species is exposed to all the objections that confront ideas of relative and purely abstract terms.

40 B τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ὑπὸ τῆς ταὐτοῦ . . . κρατουμένῳ. The other


forward but controlled by the revolution of the same.” The ‘but’ is over-subtle and not in the Greek. εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν is merely con- trasted as a motion of translation with revolution on an axis. There is no idea of a motion inacircle as the resultant of two forces. rd δὲ τρεπόμενα x. τ. dX. is rightly rendered, except that τρεπόμενα is not “that move ina circle,” but as Martin says φρξ vont et revienneni, that is, which seem to “hedge aside from the direct forthright.” Zeller (Phil. d. Gr. 1875, II 1, 685) and Jowett wrongly take κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα to mean “in the likeness of the fixed stars.” The phrase is merely a pleonastic resumption of καθάπερ--- ἐρρήθη, which refers to the creation of planets as ὄργανα χρόνου (cf. supra on 37 B). For πλάνην τοιαύτην = τρεπόμενα Ch 51 C τοιαύτην ἀλήθειαν and the idiomatic ἕτερα τοιαῦτα Rep. 488 B; cf. also 87 C and Herod. VI 105 ἡμεροδρόμον τε καὶ τοῦτο μελετῶντα.

40 C φύλακα καὶ δημιουργόν. Our editor rightly rejects Grote’s hypothesis that the earth revolves, and translates εἱλλομένην well “globed.”? We need not be surprised at δημιουργόν used of the passive earth; cf. Cic. De Nat. Deor. II 19, 49: Primusque sol qui astrorum tenet principatum ita movetur ut cum terras larga luce compleverit, easdem modo his modo illis ex partibus opace?.

40 D. Mr. Archer-Hind rightly retains οὐ before δυναμένοις, which Jowett with some MSS omits. There is no superstition in all Plato unaccompanied by irony ; cf. the good notes on 40 D-E and on 71 E.

40 D ἄνευ «τῶν» δι’ ὄψεως τούτων αὐτῶν μιμημάτων is the reading our editor would substitute for the Vulgate ἄνευ διόψεως τούτων αὐ τῶν μιμημάτων. He has in his favor the doubtfulness of διόψεως, which is not found elsewhere before Plutarch, though we may of course ask, where did Plutarch get it if not here? But I think what Mr. Archer-Hind calls “an uncouth phrase” admits of a strong defense by Platonic analogies. The stars are but an image of true mathematical movements ; cf. Rep. 529 D τῇ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον. An orrery, then, would be one of those imitations twice removed on which Plato’s imagination loves to dwell. Hence the αὖ on which editors stumble; cf. Repub. 510 E τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν ad χρώμενοι.

41 ( ἀθανάτοις ὁμώνυμον. ὁμώνυμος in Plato is on its way to the technical Aristotelian sense (cf. Parmen. 133 D), but never reaches it. Its force here is rhetorical, as θεῖον shows. The logical conno- tations of the Aristotelian adverb ὁμωνύμως, which Plato does not use, are misleading. Below, is it not just possible that ἐθελόντων is


genitive absolute (cf. 42 E and 47 A ἰδόντων), and that τῶν det δίκῃ means the justice of the eternities ”? cf. Leges 904 E αὕτη τοι δίκη ἐστὶ θεῶν of "ολυμπον ἔχουσιν, and 905 A ἣν πασῶν δικῶν διαφερόντως ἔταξαν.---ὑπαρξάμενος. This transitive’’ (?) use of the middle of this verb zs quoted in Liddell and Scott and referred to this passage. 41 D. Our editor’s note is asingular mixture of truth and error. He rightly emphasizes the distinction (confounded by Martin) between the νομή or apportionment to the stars of 41 D, and the σπόρος Or Sowing in the planets ὄργανα χρόνου of 42.D. But other- wise his interpretation is almost identical with that of Martin, which he pronounces wholly un-Platonic, indeed unintelligible,” but which he must have read very hastily. Martin thinks God first apportioned among the heavenly bodies large masses of soul, out of whose substance the individual souls were afterwards made, and into which they were finally to be reabsorbed. He does not deny, as Mr. Archer-Hind thinks, the formation of the individual souls out of these larger souls, but he implies that an inexhausted portion of the larger soul is left in the star, and that the individual soul on its return is merged in this. Mr. Archer-Hind’s view differs only in that he assumes the deposits in the stars to be all used up in the formation of individual souls, and that he does not expressly state that the single souls on their return to the star merge their individuality. Both are in error, as is Mr. Henry Jackson, when he speaks (J. of Phil. 25, p. 22) of “several parcels of souls—assigned to their respective stars.” The souls assigned to thestars are already divided—the individualization is accomplished by the νομή. Surely the stars are numerous enough to allow of this, and at any rate there is not a word in the Greek that suggests a further division. The close analogy of the myth at the end of the Republic makes this certain to a delicate literary sense. The word of Lachesis Daughter of Necessity (617 E) answers ethically to the Demiurgus’ enumeration of the laws of destiny (cf. θεὸς ἀναίτιος With iva τῆς ἔπειτα εἴη κακίας . . . ἀναίτιος 42 D), and the souls are in each case distinct individuals prepared for the mortal birth. That the Timaeus describes an absolute beginning and the Repub- lic merely the beginning of a new cycle is irrelevant to the argu- ment. In both passages Plato’s imagination associates individual souls with stars; cf. Rep. 621 B καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐξαπίνης ἄλλον ἄλλῃ φέρεσθαι ἄνω εἰς τὴν γένεσιν ἄττοντας ὥσπερ ἀστέρας. The Platonic tradition has always understood in this sense, quel che Timeo delle anime argomenta.” Cf. also Repub. 611 A ὅτι dei ἂν

> eo ᾿ εἰεν αἱ AUTAL.


41 E τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξε. We need not be surprised that “here in Plato’s maturest period we have something closely resembling the ἀνάμνησις of the Phaedo and Phaedrus.” The idea was always present to Plato, and its expression was always myth- ical; cf. Polit. 278 C θαυμάζοιμεν ἂν οὖν, εἰ ταὐτὸν τόῦτο ἡμῶν ψυχὴ φύσει περὶ τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα πεπονθυῖα «x. τ. d., the meaning of which passage is substantially the same as that of Meno 81 CD, though the suggestion of reminiscence in the former passage is wholly lost in Jowett’s translation, and the negative half of the doctrine is, I think, exaggerated by Campbell’s rendering of